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Do infants learn to interpret others’ actions through their own
experience producing goal-directed action, or does some knowl-
edge of others’ actions precede ﬁrst-person experience? Several
studies report that motor experience enhances action understand-
ing, but the nature of this effect is not well understood. The pres-
ent research investigates what is learned during early motoric
production, and it tests whether knowledge of goal-directed
actions, including an assumption that actors maximize efﬁciency
given environmental constraints, exists before experience produc-
ing such actions. Three-month-old infants (who cannot yet effec-
tively reach for and grasp objects) were given novel experience
retrieving objects that rested on a surface with no barriers. They
were then shown an actor reaching for an object over a barrier and
tested for sensitivity to the efﬁciency of the action. These infants
showed heightened attention when the agent reached inefﬁciently
for a goal object; in contrast, infants who lacked successful reach-
ing experience did not differentiate between direct and indirect
reaches. Given that the infants could reach directly for objects dur-
ing training and were given no opportunity to update their actions
based on environmental constraints, the training experience itself
is unlikely to have provided a basis for learning about action efﬁ-
ciency. We suggest that infants apply a general assumption of ef-
ﬁcient action as soon as they have sufﬁcient information (possibly
derived from their own action experience) to identify an agent’s
goal in a given instance.
goal inference | action representation | motor cognition |
conceptual development
A
hallmark of goal-directed action is its ﬂexibility (1). In-
telligent agents draw on causal and functional knowledge to
update their action plans based on the constraints and affor-
dances of the current environment. As a result, the same goal
can be achieved with various means depending on the situation,
and the same movements can reﬂect diverse goals. This ﬂexibility
poses a nontrivial inference problem for the outside observer
seeking to uncover agents’ intentions and predict their future
behavior.
Humans nonetheless make sense of others’ behavior, and do
so by recruiting a “theory of mind” that relates observable
actions to subjective mental states (2). This intuitive theory relies
on a key assumption that agents are rational, pursuing their
goals with the most efﬁcient means possible in a given context
(3, 4). By assuming that agents pursue their goals efﬁciently, an
observer can ﬂexibly adapt expectations about others’ actions to
the constraints of a given situation, and can interpret the same
actions differently based on the context. This efﬁciency assump-
tion thus constrains an otherwise underdetermined inference
problem, providing a ﬂexible schema for explaining and pre-
dicting action.
The Origins of Rational Action Knowledge
Studies with human infants suggest that this efﬁciency assumption
is in place by the second half of the ﬁrst year. When shown visual
displays of an agent passing over an obstacle to approach a goal
object, infants expect the agent to take a more direct approach
once the obstacle is removed, exhibiting violation of expectation
if the agent continues to perform a curvilinear trajectory (5, 6).
Moreover, when infants have begun to imitate other people’s
actions on objects, their patterns of imitation depend on the
constraints on the other agent (ref. 7; see discussion in refs. 8, 9):
for example, if 14-mo-old infants view an agent activating a light
by pressing with her forehead, they tend to activate the light with
a simple press of the hand when the observed agent’s hands were
occupied (and hence, this more efﬁcient means of activating
the light was unavailable to her), and use their foreheads when
the observed agent’s hands were free (and hence, she chose the
forehead action over the apparently more efﬁcient means).
These studies suggest that infants encode actions in terms of
goals by analyzing them with respect to physical constraints, and
expect agents to update actions as affordances of the environ-
ment change. It seems that a productive, efﬁciency-based action
schema is available from early in life, supporting ﬂexible, con-
text-dependent interpretations of others’ actions (5, 10, 11).
In the present research, we aim to shed light on (i) the origins
of these goal-based action representations and (ii) the speciﬁc
mechanisms that support action understanding in early infancy.
In particular, we explore the claim that our ability to understand
others’ goals depends on ﬁrst-person experience producing goal-
directed action (12–15). On one version of this proposal—the
ideomotor or motor resonance view (16)—online processing of
others’ actions requires reactivation of motor representations
(so-called mirror neurons; refs. 17, 18) that are derived from
ﬁrst-person production and correspond to the kinematics of
speciﬁc actions in the observer’s motor repertoire (8, 15). By this
hypothesis, visuomotor “mirror” representations—which could
be innate (18, 19) or built from correlated sensory and motor
action input (20, 21)—allow for the activation of a corre-
sponding motor program following perception of another’s action.
Spreading activation from the motor plan to a representation
of the action’s salient visual or auditory effects then allows the
observer to categorize the observed action as directed toward
that effect or end state (22, 23). Neurons in macaque inferior
parietal lobule that are tuned to the end goal of an observed
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Saction (i.e., grasp to eat vs. grasp to place; ref. 24) may be the
last stage in a feed-forward chain of such action–effect asso-
ciations (25).
If such a mechanism were the sole foundation for action
comprehension, infants’ initial understanding of action goals
should be limited to those for which they have built the relevant
set of associations at this ﬁrst-person motoric level (13, 15). There
is ample evidence that humans develop alternative mechanisms,
as even infants at the end of their ﬁrst year are able to interpret
(and reason about the efﬁciency of) unfamiliar actions per-
formed by novel agents (5, 6), as well as actions that violate
human biomechanical constraints (26). However, these more ab-
stract action representations may be analogical extensions of a
mechanism initially derived from and limited by ﬁrst-person motor
experience (27). The ﬁrst aim of the present research was to test
this possibility by investigating whether 3-mo-old infants (the
youngest age in which goal-based action representations have
been reported) can understand actions that are kinematically
distinct from those they have produced.
Our second aim was to investigate a related proposal about the
origins of goal-based action representations—speciﬁcally, the
claim that the general concept of goal-directed action is itself
constructed from active production (12, 13). On the strongest
version of this view, the very notion that movements are directed
toward goals may be learned from early ﬁrst-person experience
engaging in intentional action (27, 28). At approximately 4 to 5
mo of age, infants begin to retrieve objects by reaching and
grasping (29), and at 6 to 7 mo, they begin to locomote in-
dependently (30). By performing such actions, infants may learn
that their own movements are driven by internal goals or desires,
that the physical environment imposes constraints on those
movements, and that they tend to achieve goals efﬁciently given
the constraints of the environment. Infants might observe, for
example, that they reach toward objects via a direct path when
possible, and learn through trial and error that indirect paths are
necessary when physical barriers impede the direct route. On this
view, infants’ initial representations of actions would be limited
to perceptual properties of the moving body (e.g., visual kine-
matics), with ﬁrst-person action experience providing a basis for
building additional abstractions like goals or intentions, and
for constructing a set of rules or principles for reasoning about
actions directed toward goals. One alternative to this view is that
infants construct these concepts based, in part, on visual analysis
of actions performed by others (31). Another possibility is that
action understanding relies on evolved, domain-speciﬁc mecha-
nisms for interpreting and predicting the actions of others (32),
and that certain abstract assumptions, including a principle of
efﬁciency, are available as innate constraints on this action per-
ception system (33). Thus, the present research aimed to in-
vestigate whether the full breadth of early goal knowledge can be
explained in terms of information acquired during ﬁrst-person
motor production.
Probing the Role of Active Experience
The view that motor representations are necessary for online
action processing and the view that goal concepts are built from
ﬁrst-person experience both make the prediction that infants will
be unable to identify others’ goals before experience engaging in
goal-directed action, and that the range of actions they can
successfully interpret will expand with the development of their
motor repertoires (27, 34). Broadly consistent with these pre-
dictions, correlational studies ﬁnd that the ability to organize
movements around goals is related to improvements in un-
derstanding others’ actions (35–38). However, correlational ﬁnd-
ings do not reveal whether action experience plays a causal role in
the development of action understanding.
Training studies that experimentally alter infants’ early action
experience provide an especially useful tool for addressing this
question, and reveal striking and reliable effects of infants’ ﬁrst-
person action experience on subsequent perception of goal-directed
actions (34, 39, 40). Sommerville et al. (39) report one particularly
dramatic training effect at 3 mo, an age at which infants can
neither locomote to objects nor reach for them (41). Earlier
research found that, if habituated to an agent reaching for one
of two objects, 6-mo-old infants dishabituate when the agent
reaches for the previously ignored object, even when the reach
direction is consistent with that of the previously demonstrated
action (42). This tendency to encode the object of an observed
reach suggests that infants represent the action in terms of its
goal or end-state over other more superﬁcial properties (e.g.,
reach trajectory). Because intentional grasping behavior tends to
emerge between 4 and 5 mo (29, 41), the theories reviewed
earlier predict that infants younger than 4 mo should not encode
the end-goal in this task. Indeed, 3-mo-old infants generally fail
to do so (39). However, infants given a brief training intervention
in which they wore Velcro-covered mittens while interacting with
Velcro-covered objects (allowing them to successfully manipu-
late and retrieve the objects) showed heightened attention to test
displays in which an agent who had previously reached for one
object began to reach for the other (29). This phenomenon
appears speciﬁc to active engagement, as infants failed to en-
code the goal-object following a matched observational training
condition (40).
These and related ﬁndings (34) are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that experience producing actions plays a central role in
the emergence of action understanding in infancy, and raise
questions concerning the nature of this contribution. First, in-
formation acquired from action production could be represented
at various levels of abstraction: the low-level kinematic proper-
ties of the executed movements, the causal or functional prop-
erties exploited in executing the action, and the abstract goal to
which the actions are directed. If early action understanding
relies on a motor resonance mechanism that binds sensory
effects to actions represented at a kinematic level, infants should
initially fail to generalize goals to actions with different motoric
properties. The present studies test whether infants derive in-
formation from their own actions at a level of abstraction that
supports generalization to kinematically distinct actions.
Second, Sommerville et al.’s results (39) suggest that motori-
cally trained 3-mo-old infants encode goal-relevant properties
of an action (i.e., its end-state), but these results do not distin-
guish the information infants gain from their own actions from
the knowledge of goal-directed action they might possess before
the training experience. Speciﬁcally, it is unknown whether their
goal representations are already constrained by the efﬁciency-
based schema that structures action representation later in
development. Identifying an agent’s goal in a particular instance
can rely on abstract knowledge of others’ goals and behavior
(principles of rational action), as well as more speciﬁc informa-
tion relevant to the particular goal context (e.g., knowledge of
the kinds of goals people tend to have in a given situation and of
the causal relations that link actions to their effects on the en-
vironment). Do infants derive one or more of these pieces of in-
formation from their own action production, or is this information
available to infants independently of the training experience?
Importantly, intervention on infants’ action experiences can
provide two distinct windows into the origins of goal represen-
tation. First, with these interventions, we can identify develop-
mental experiences that contribute to successful goal attribution
by manipulating these experiences in a controlled manner. Sec-
ond, by enabling infants to identify an agent’s goal much earlier
than they otherwise could, these paradigms allow us to investi-
gate whether infants, upon gaining the ability to identify simple
reaching goals, exhibit more general expectations have about
how those goals will be pursued. By probing infants’ knowledge
about intentional action as they ﬁrst become capable of inferring
a goal in a particular instance, we can gain insights into the prior
assumptions prereaching infants bring to the training experience.
Thus, the second aim of the present studies was to investigate
whether information derived from actions produced during train-
ing phase interacts with more general principles that are in place
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actions are efﬁcient and subject to physical constraints.
Here, we adopt the training manipulation used by Sommer-
ville et al. (39) and test infants with a paradigm that requires
ﬂexibly updating action expectations based on the presence or
position of physical obstacles (5). Across ﬁve experiments, we
manipulate 3-mo-old infants’ experience producing simple object-
retrieval actions and test their sensitivity to the efﬁciency of
reaching actions as measured by looking time (Fig. 1). In experi-
ments 1 to 3 (discussed ﬁrst), infants were assigned to one of
three training manipulations: an effective action condition (ex-
periment 1) in which they interact with Velcro-covered objects
while wearing Velcro-covered mittens, an ineffective action con-
dition (experiment 2) in which they interact with the same objects
while wearing mittens that lack Velcro, and a no-training condi-
tion (experiment 3) in which infants perform the looking time task
without any prior exposure to the objects. Infants in all three ex-
periments participated in the same violation-of-expectation task
(43) in which they were habituated to an agent reaching in an
arched path over a barrier to grasp and retrieve an object. If
infants understand that hands cannot reach through solid bar-
riers, the arched path can be seen as an efﬁcient means of re-
trieving the object. The barrier was then removed and the agent
pursued the goal with a familiar but now inefﬁcient arched reach,
or with a novel but efﬁcient direct reach. In experiments 4 and 5
(discussed second), we aimed to replicate the results of experi-
ment 1 and conﬁrm that they depend on an analysis of the efﬁ-
ciency of the reaching action with respect to physical constraints
of the environment.
Results
The proportion of looking to the inefﬁcient action event relative
to the efﬁcient action event was calculated for each test pair and
averaged across all three test pairs for each subject. Results are
displayed in Fig. 2. Comparing experiments 1 through 3, we
observed a signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of looking to
the inefﬁcient action across the training groups [F(2, 57) = 4.794,
P = 0.012]. One-sample t tests comparing to a chance level of 0.5
revealed a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of looking to the in-
efﬁcient action in the effective action training condition [t(19) =
2.669, P = 0.015], but not in the ineffective action training con-
dition [t(19) = −1.477, P = 0.156], nor the no-training condition
[t(19) = −1.122, P = 0.276]. The proportion of looking to the in-
efﬁcient action was higher in the effective action condition than
in the ineffective action condition [t (38) = 2.791, P = 0.008] or the
no-training condition [t(38) = 2.658, P = 0.011]. Analysis of raw
looking times yielded comparable results (SI Data, Section 1.2).
Thus, following training in which they were able to manip-
ulate and retrieve objects, infants expected an agent to take
the shortest available path to the demonstrated goal, exhibiting
heightened attention when an agent performed a perceptually
familiar but newly inefﬁcient reach. This effect was absent in
infants given no experience, or experience in which their actions
were ineffective, who tended to look longer at the kinematically
novel straight reach. Reaching for and retrieving objects evi-
dently provides infants with information needed to encode the
goal of another agent’s action, even when that action is kine-
matically distinct from those performed during training. Having
identiﬁed the agent’s goal, infants then expect it to be pursued
with efﬁcient means.
Previous research suggests that older, more motorically ca-
pable infants expect a direct path only when a previously dem-
onstrated indirect path could be explained in terms of physical
constraints on the action (5). If an agent previously reached on
an indirect path in the absence of any barrier, infants did not
represent the action as directed toward the goal object. In ex-
periment 4, we replicate the procedure of experiment 1 and
compare it to experiment 5, in which infants undergo effective
action training followed by a habituation phase in which the
arched path of the agent’s reach is not necessitated the physical
constraints of the environment, and therefore cannot readily be
interpreted as directed toward the object. If infants trained with
effective actions look longer to the arching reach because it is
inefﬁcient with respect to a previously demonstrated goal, and
understand that solid objects constrain action, then looking time
to the very same test displays should differ depending on whether
an obstacle was present (constrained action condition, experi-
ment 4) or absent (unconstrained action condition, experiment
5) during the habituation phase. These experiments also address
two alternative explanations of the effects in experiment 1. First,
infants in the effective action condition may have performed more
straight object-directed reaches than infants in the ineffective ac-
tion condition, and then reacted to the low-level similarity be-
tween the actions they produced during the training phase and
Fig. 1. In experiment 1, subjects participated in effective action training
(A1) followed by a constrained action habituation phase (H1) and a test
phase involving three efﬁcient action displays (T1) and three inefﬁcient ac-
tion displays (T2), presented in alternation. In experiments 2 and 3, subjects
viewed the same sequence of habituation and test displays, but preceded by
the ineffective action training (A2) and no training (A3), respectively. Ex-
periment 4 replicated experiment 1 (A1, H1). In experiment 5, subjects par-
ticipated in the effective action training (A1) followed by an unconstrained
action habituation phase (H2). All ﬁve experiments present the identical test
displays (T1 and T2).
Fig. 2. Proportion of looking time to inefﬁcient vs. efﬁcient action displays
across experiments 1 to 5 (n = 112). Error bars reﬂect ±1 SEM.
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action condition may have become more attentive to objects in
the agent’s environment. During both test displays, the barrier
present during habituation is removed; if infants represented the
inefﬁcient test display as an otherwise familiar event in which an
object has disappeared, they might ﬁnd this event more in-
teresting than the efﬁcient test display in which the barrier has
disappeared but the action is also different. If infants in the ef-
fective action condition showed heightened attention to an
arching reach test event because this reach was perceptually
dissimilar from the actions they produced during the training or
because the disappearance of the barrier was more salient in this
event, infants in experiment 4 and experiment 5 should show this
looking preference.
Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that infants are indeed sensitive
to the efﬁciency of the reaching actions rather than more su-
perﬁcial properties of the events, as their patterns of looking
depended on the constraints on action during the initial goal
familiarization. At test, there was a signiﬁcant difference in the
proportion of looking to the efﬁcient reaching action across the
two habituation groups [F(1, 50) = 4.241, P = 0.045], with infants
in the constrained action condition (experiment 4) looking
longer at the inefﬁcient actions [t(25) = 3.539, P = 0.002],
replicating the results of experiment 1, whereas those in the
unconstrained action condition showed no looking preferences
at test [t(25) = 0.440, P = 0.663; SI Data, Section 1.2, includes
analysis of raw looking times]. Experiment 4 therefore replicated
the results of experiment 1, and experiment 5 revealed that
infants identiﬁed the object as the actor’s goal only when her
actions were efﬁcient with respect to that goal during the ha-
bituation phase.
These ﬁndings provide evidence that subjects encoded the
reach as directed toward the object only when the indirect path
observed in the habituation phase could be explained by the
physical constraints posed by the obstacle. It is therefore unlikely
that the pattern of looking times observed in experiments 1
through 3 was a result of the visual similarity between move-
ments produced during training and those observed in the test
events. In experiments 4 and 5, infants were presented with the
same training and the same test displays, but exhibited increased
looking to inefﬁcient reaches only when a barrier constrained
action during habituation. Thus, prereaching infants, given ex-
perience in the absence of barriers, interpret others’ actions in
accord with assumptions of solidity (agents cannot pass through
solid obstacles) and efﬁciency (agents will reach on the most
direct unimpeded path).
Discussion
Together, these results accord with previous research in ﬁnding
that 3-mo-old infants extract the goal of simple object-directed
actions following active reaching experience. Motorically expe-
rienced infants not only encode goal-relevant properties of ob-
served actions (39, 40), but are also sensitive to the directness of
actions toward that goal. These expectations emerge only when
the agent’s initial arched reach is necessitated by a physical
barrier, suggesting that infants represent actions as subject to
physical constraints of the environment.
These ﬁndings provide two important constraints on the na-
ture of the relationship between action production and com-
prehension in infancy. First, infants themselves can reach directly
for the objects in the training task, yet must generalize what is
learned to an action in which an agent takes an arched path over
a barrier. This generalization does not reﬂect a simple failure
to distinguish between direct and indirect paths, as infants
exhibit sensitivity to these differing trajectories in the test phase.
Thus, the effects of ﬁrst-person action experience do not require
alignment between the trajectories of the observed action and
the motor act performed by the infant, casting doubt on theories
that explain early action processing in terms of a direct mapping
of observed actions onto the motoric/kinematic properties of
executed acts (15) or their associated bodily conﬁgurations (14).
Furthermore, these data constrain the scope of what could
be learned during ﬁrst-person action production. Infants in the
present experiment could reach freely for objects and did not
need to update their actions based on context. The training
itself is therefore unlikely to have provided a basis for learning
that goal-directed actions are efﬁcient and limited by physical
obstacles, making it implausible that an understanding of efﬁ-
cient goal-directed action was constructed de novo during the
training phase. The observed efﬁciency expectations might in-
stead reﬂect innate constraints on an evolved action perception
system, or regularities learned from visual analysis of others’
actions over the ﬁrst 3 mo of life. Of course, the present results
can only directly speak to the role of the experience manipulated
during the experiment: thus, we cannot exclude the possibility
that an efﬁciency assumption is learned from motor production
before the training. However, given the limited motor repertoire
available at this age, we ﬁnd it unlikely that such expectations
could be derived solely from ﬁrst-person motor experience.
Either way, the present ﬁndings suggest that effects of ﬁrst-
person experience observed in previous studies (39) may not re-
ﬂect the initial construction of goal knowledge; instead, manipu-
lations of ﬁrst-person experience likely provide information
necessary for the expression of this knowledge. Crucially, an ob-
server can only evaluate the efﬁciency of an action with respect to
a speciﬁc goal and speciﬁc environmental constraints—if infants
lacked information relevant to identifying the goal, they would
be unable to analyze the efﬁciency of the action even if solidity
and efﬁciency assumptions were in place as abstract constraints
on infants’ action interpretation. If experience producing simple
reaching actions provides infants with information relevant to
inferring the goal of a given object-directed reach, more general
knowledge about solidity and efﬁciency could be applied as soon
as the agent’s particular goal has been identiﬁed.
Relation to Motor Theories
B a s e do ne f f e c t so fﬁrst-person experience on processing of
others’ actions (34, 39) and on overlap in the neural representa-
tions recruited during action production and perception (17, 18), it
has been argued that action understanding depends on reacti-
vation of motor representations derived from ﬁrst-person expe-
rience. Motor resonance and “direct matching” theories propose
that action understanding requires linking visual input to motor
representations in premotor and parietal cortices and perhaps
running forward simulations on these motor chains (18, 25, 44).
Although advocates of these theories grant that alternative mech-
anisms (e.g., nonmotoric regions that show heightened response to
inefﬁcient actions; ref. 45) may exist (46), they argue that the ability
to map observed actions directly onto ﬁrst-person motor repre-
sentations provides a privileged and developmentally founda-
tional route to understanding to others’ intentions (13, 20).
Importantly, the leanest direct matching version of the motor
resonance model (18, 20) cannot account for goal identiﬁcation
in situations that require integrating nonmotoric situational in-
formation (in particular, information about the constraints on
the agent) in interpreting an action. Context-speciﬁcity can be
incorporated in an ideomotor model by assuming that action-
effect relationships are learned in a state-dependent manner
(22). However, although a store of such contingencies could
eventually support context-sensitive action interpretation, this
learning would require large corpora of action statistics wherein
the action–effect pairings are learned separately under each
possible environmental state. If infants adapt their expectations
to physical constraints on an agent only by learning separate
action–effect associations under different environmental con-
ditions, producing actions under a ﬁxed set of constraints should
fail to provide a beneﬁt in the looking time task used here. In the
present experiment, subjects were sensitive to the context in
which the action was executed (i.e., whether the barrier con-
strained the action or not) even though no obstacles were pres-
ent in the training phase. Infants could not solve this task by
learning speciﬁc associations between particular actions and
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must have integrated more general assumptions of efﬁciency and
solidity to analyze the observed actions. These results suggest
that infants possess a general schema for relating actions to
effects across constraint variation that they themselves have not
experienced. Thus, even the very earliest evidence for goal-based
action processing suggests representations more abstract than
those assumed by dominant motor resonance theories. Others
have adopted a broader deﬁnition of “motor” simulation that
includes representations abstracted away from the kinematic
properties of actions, encompassing functional or causal in-
formation about how physical movements generate effects on the
environment (47, 48). These accounts are broadly consistent with
the perspective provided here in that they aim to explain how
top-down constraints enable the identiﬁcation of abstract goals
from visual representations of kinematics.
What Are Infants Learning?
We ﬁnd it unlikely that infants learn a general principle of efﬁ-
ciency on the basis of information provided during the training
phase, as they themselves did not face varying environmental
constraints. Why, then, do infants exhibit sensitivity to efﬁciency
only following action training? One possibility is that successfully
reaching for and displacing objects may heighten infants’ attention
to events in which others engage in similar actions. Having
attended to the events, infants may then apply an assumption of
efﬁcient action to identify the agent’s goal. Alternatively, infants
may learn about speciﬁc properties of action from their own action
experience. In this case, we must distinguish between learning the
concept of a goal itself, and acquiring information relevant to
identifying a particular goal in a given instance. Recent com-
putational models that characterize goal inference as “inverse
planning” (49, 50) help to make this distinction explicit. Ac-
cording to these models, an observer can predict an agent’s
movements based on knowledge of what the agent wants (i.e.,
the value associated with particular states of the world), causal
knowledge of which action sequences can generate desired states,
and knowledge of the costs associated with particular actions (by
assuming that agents will maximize expected utility). Goals can
be inferred from observed movements by inverting this forward
planning schema and integrating it with prior knowledge about
what goals are likely in a given context.
According to this inverse planning framework, goal attribution
depends on the general inferential schema that represents actions
as directed toward goal states and assumes efﬁcient pursuit of
those states (i.e., general principles of rational action), but also on
information speciﬁc to a given action and context. First, the ob-
server must have knowledge of the relationships between partic-
ular actions and their effects. In the model of Baker et al. (49),
forward planning computations operate over a hard-coded state
transition distribution, which speciﬁes the probability that taking
a particular action A in a particular state S will generate state S′.
This knowledge of how actions relate to states of the world can be
thought of as a simple representation of the relevant causal
structure of the environment, which is needed to implement
forward and inverse planning in a given action context.
With respect to the present results, it is possible that active
training provides infants with causal knowledge relevant to un-
derstanding the structure of grasping actions. Perhaps infants
learn, for example, that a hand making contact with an object can
successfully entrain the object and displace it toward the body.
When infants understand the basic causal relations that structure
reaching actions, they can interpret the observed actions of other
agents as a means of bringing about the goal state of retrieval.
This view is consistent with the results of a recent study (51) in
which 12-mo-old infants’ sensitivity to the functional affordances
of different grasp conﬁgurations was related to infants’ own
grasp production. Only infants who produced precision grasps
themselves appeared to detect when another agent initiated
a goal-directed action with a causally inappropriate grasp con-
ﬁguration (i.e., a precision grasp for lifting an inverted bowl; see
also ref. 52). Another prerequisite knowledge structure in the
model of Baker et al. (49) is a probability distribution over
possible goals. For the inversion of forward planning to generate
a unique solution, the observer needs some constraints on the
goals to be entertained. One possibility is that infants initially
lack certain knowledge of which goals are likely in a given con-
text and that ﬁrst-person experience raises infants’ representa-
tion of the probability of object-directed goals, constraining the
set of possible goals they consider and evaluate against the ob-
served action.
Alternatively, infants might already possess the information
needed to identify the actor’s goal, but be unable to analyze the
efﬁciency of the action toward that goal state. Infants might
learn, for example, about the cost associated with different
reaches (e.g., via variability in their own reaching, learn that
longer paths are more effortful). Infants would then need to
generalize cost information from these executed actions to the
actions observed in the looking time task, which raises the more
general question of how observers identify the costs of actions
outside of their motor repertoire (discussed in refs. 11, 26).
Another possibility is that the training heightens infants’ sensi-
tivity to environmental constraints: in the test trials, the barrier
present during the habituation phase was removed. If training
leads infants to be more attentive to the environment sur-
rounding theirs and others’ actions, it is possible that only the
trained infants notice the disappearance of the barrier from an
otherwise familiar arching reach event (and represent the direct
reach as a novel event altogether). However, because the effect
is observed only following constrained-action habituation, we
would have to assume that the trained infants are uniquely at-
tentive to objects that stand between an agent and her goal. Such
selective attention to objects that function as barriers would
imply that infants represent objects as constraints on possible
actions (where the notion of constraint itself depends on an as-
sumption that actions are efﬁcient).
Although the present results do not bear on these alternatives
directly, the training experiences available in experiments 1 and 2
mostly differ in the extent to which infants successfully entrained
and retrieved the objects. The fact that infants in effective and
ineffective action conditions were exposed to the objects, and
presumably experienced the goal of contacting them, lends cre-
dence to the hypothesis that infants are learning about the causal
affordances of the newly effective hand. However, further re-
search is needed to directly test these and other possibilities. The
present experiments nonetheless cast doubt on the proposal that
manipulations of ﬁrst-person action experience (39, 40) facilitate
the construction of the very concept of a goal or the principle
of rational action. Instead, we suggest that these interventions
provide infants with more speciﬁc knowledge that enables them
to identify the agent’sg o a l ,a n dt h a ti n f a n t sc a nt h e nr e a s o n
about this goal in accordance with more general assumptions
that exist independently of the manipulated action experience.
Materials and Methods
Experiments 1 to 3. Participants. A total of 60 infants (Meanage = 3.60 mo;
range, 91–122 d) were randomly assigned to one of three training conditions
(effective action condition, n = 20; ineffective action condition, n = 20; or
no-training condition, n = 20; SI Procedures, Section 2.1, includes recruitment
and inclusion information).
Materials and procedure. In the training phase of experiments 1 and 2, subjects
were seated on a caregiver’s lap at an 86 × 58-cm table. Hands were ﬁtted
with gray mittens that were or were not covered with Velcro (effective and
ineffective action conditions, respectively). Subjects were then given 3 min
to freely interact with a Velcro-covered ball and bear (SI Procedures, Section
2.2). Infants in the no-training condition were not exposed to the objects
and proceeded immediately to the looking time assessment.
In the violation-of-expectation task, video stimuli were presented with
Keynote software on a 62 × 38-cm LCD screen. Each trial ended when sub-
jects looked away from the stimulus for 2 s consecutively, or if they looked
for a cumulative 45 s (SI Procedures, Section 2.3, provides details of pre-
sentation and coding procedures). During the habituation phase, each video
clip (∼5 s duration) began with a person wearing a gray mitten seated at
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Sa table facing a barrier that stood between the person and a Velcro-covered
ball (the same ball used during training). The person then reached in an
arching manner over the barrier to retrieve the object, and the video froze
on the ﬁnal frame of the person holding the ball in front of her torso. The
barrier varied in height over the course of habituation trials (SI Data, Section
1.1, provides analysis of habituation data), and the height of the person’s
reach aligned with that of the barrier. Infants then viewed a transition trial
in which the barrier was removed and only the table and the object
remained. During the test phase, the barrier remained absent and the per-
son reached with the same arching path viewed during habituation (no
longer an efﬁcient means) or with a perceptually novel straight path (now
efﬁcient). Subjects viewed three efﬁcient reaches in alternation with three
inefﬁcient reaches, with order of efﬁcient and inefﬁcient trials counter-
balanced across subjects.
Experiments 4 and 5. Participants. A total of 52 infants (Meanage = 3.56 mo;
range, 93–122 d) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
(constrained action, n = 26; unconstrained action, n = 26; SI Procedures,
Section 2.1).
Materials and procedure. All subjects participated in the effective action
training condition, replicating the training procedure described earlier (SI
Procedures, Section 2.4, provides a description of minor changes to the
procedure). The displays used in experiment 4 (constrained action during
habituation) were identical to those in experiment 1. The displays in ex-
periment 5 (unconstrained action during habituation) were identical except
that the barrier was placed on the opposite side of the goal object during
the habituation events such that it did not constrain the person’s reaching
action. Test events were as in experiments 1 to 3.
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